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Regionbuilding at a European periphery: a case study of
re-scaling in the Barents Region
Abstract
„New institutional spaces' across borders“ in Europe have a lot to do with the decline of protectionism,
up streaming neoliberalism, the end of the Cold War and political concessions on regional integration,
while security politics were more important in border areas in previous times. A cross-border region is a
fruitful research subject for analysing these influences. Especially in Europe these regions emerged after
the end of the Second World War, some of them developed bottom-up on functional premises while
others were constructed from above. How institutionbuilding in peripheral crossborder areas occurs is
the leading question in this paper. The periphery is a central factor in the question and due to this the
interdependences might be rather weak on a regional level. These premises are tested with two different
theoretical models and the case of the Barents Region.
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„New institutional spaces’ across borders“ in Europe have a lot to do with the decline of protection-
ism, up streaming neoliberalism, the end of the Cold War and political concessions on regional inte-
gration, while security politics were more important in border areas in previous times. A cross-border 
region is a fruitful research subject for analysing these influences. Especially in Europe these regions 
emerged after the end of the Second World War, some of them developed bottom-up on functional 
premises while others were constructed from above. How institutionbuilding in peripheral cross-
border areas occurs is the leading question in this paper. The periphery is a central factor in the ques-
tion and due to this the interdependences might be rather weak on a regional level. These premises are 
tested with two different theoretical models and the case of the Barents Region. 
 
Introduction 
The discourse about “Europe of Regions” has been in the European Union for a fairly long time, espe-
cially concerning the policy of cohesion, omnipresent. The upcoming of cross-border and transna-
tional regionalism helped to promote a renaissance of regional scale as a vital element in economical 
and political governance (Scott 2000: 105). With supranational support such a process should lead to 
multiple integration, stronger economic networking and regional focused policies. 
In political science the topic of cross-border cooperation (CBC) is faced with a variety of differ-
ent theoretical approaches. The common framework can usually be found in the realm of multi-level 
governance (e.g. Hooghe/Marks 2003). Through the influence from different levels a strict allocation 
to national or international politics seems impossible. Also different approaches are used: some older 
studies use Sabatiers (2003) Advocacy Coalition Framework to analyse the regional governance while 
newer research uses the method of social network analysis to show the importance of ethnic prove-
nience in building networks in border-regions (e.g. Strihan 2007). Perkmann (2007) proposes a con-
nection of the research of such regions with the theoretical rescaling debate (e.g. Jessop 2002, Brenner 
2001). Peripheral border-regions in the sense of the Marxist theory of internal colonialism are said to 
look for the opportunity to build new identities with bordering regions (Blatter 2000). This process 
might challenge the central authorities, which therefore tend to build closer ties with these regions to 
prevent ideas of independence. Empirically it is not proven that regionalism is more common in poor 
regions. In the Nordic setting this hypothesis is supported with a case study about the prosperous eco-
nomic successful region of Rogaland with its growing regionalism (Fitjar 2006). 
The aim of this article is to reveal the policy of cross-border institutionbuilding in a peripheral 
environment. There is always an implicit or explicit idea behind the process of creating a region on a 
new scale. Hence, the main question in this paper is extracted from the idea of neo-institutionalism 
and asks how strongly cross-border regions are institutionalized by federal or unitary ideas and how 
they influence the development-process. This question should contribute to a better understanding on 
how cross-border cooperation emerges and is institutionalized over time and if the current European 
approach is also useful in a peripheral context. 
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Re-scaling in the light of regional governance 
Theoretically as well as methodologically the discussion about re-scaling serves as the backbone of 
the paper at hand. So far, the empirical study of cross-border regions and the theoretical debate on re-
scaling have not been linked very concrete (Perkmann 2007: 254)1. Following Brenner’s plural under-
standing of scale, “politics of scale” refers to the reconfiguration of hierarchies along and not coer-
cively within geographical entities (Brenner 2001: 600). This reconfiguration in border regions in the 
light of globalization and Europeanization brings along a potential conflict about power and resources. 
Most research that has been undertaken sheds light on the forces that are driving the re-scaling process 
as well as the consequences that are derived from it. The present situation should be seen in the con-
text of New Regionalism. The literature on New Regionalism in general examines the emergence of 
territorial scales and systems of action under the impact of state transformation and transnational inte-
gration (Keating 2008: 60). In this context, Keating (1998) underlines that regions cannot only be seen 
in the framework of states anymore, they act in a global competition between regions and especially 
city-regions in present times. This line of argument can be used for cross-border regions in particular 
also since the networks that evolve in this process move away from the old hierarchies of the west-
phalian state towards “spaces of flow” (Swyngedouw 2004). 
Rivalling theories: Europe of Regions vs. Europe of Mosaics 
Territory is a central aspect for the construct of cross-border regions, especially since it precludes that 
borders are constructed and do not define natural spaces. While examining the institutionalization of a 
region it would be too narrow to focus on a clearly pitched territory. Thus, in the paper at hand corpo-
ration is seen as any concrete action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relations between 
territorial communities and authorities as stated in the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier 
Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities2. 
The European Union follows an idea called “Europe of Regions” supported amongst others by the 
development-program Interreg (Schmitt-Egner 2005). The idea behind this approach is the promotion 
of small units, so called subsidiarity, and regional development based on the regional needs as well as 
ideas that are autonomous from national plans and visions. A formation as such has also been de-
scribed in other studies as regionalism. Regionalism clearly describes a grass root development (e.g. 
Grasse 2001). A certain amount of competences on the sub-state level is therefore a precondition and 
crucial for the creation of networks, while direct elections on this level are helpful for the aspect of 
legitimacy (so is a federal structure). The cross-border model that underlies all these aspects chal-
lenges the vertical relationship of dependence and the significance of the region as a political actor 
increases at the expense of the national administration. The means that are often used by sub-regional 
administrations to follow regional interests together with bordering regions can be circumscribed with 
Duchacek’s idea of “micro- or para-diplomacy” (1990: 14f.). In this concept regional authorities usu-
ally bypass the central institutions in several ways. Micro-diplomacy is a tool that could be more eas-
ily used by sub-regions with more competence. The economic aim usually is the creation of a regional 
growth-centre (Nilson 1997: 404). This idea is often carried by a regime that might develop in a man-
ner of functionalism. 
A counter-approach, proposed by Nilson (1997), named “Europe of Mosaics” constitutes the pre-
sent development of the European cross-border regions as a state-driven process. This approach was 
conceptualized against “Europe of Regions”. On one hand globalization did not prevail as predicted 
                                                 
1 A more elaborated explanation about scales and the politics of scale in the context of cross-border regions could be found in 
Perkman (2007). 
2 Treaty Nr. 106, www.conventions.coe.int 
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and on the other the regions could not decisively impact the European process as expected (Schmitt-
Egner 2005: 27). The state is usually still a very central actor. A top-down initiative seems to start the 
process of institutionbuilding and so to speak a rather formal regionalisation (Grasse 2001: 81). In 
many of these cases, peripheral border regions act rather as relays of national policies and are more 
oriented towards their national centres. In that sense they try to strengthen this connection to their 
favour unlike to undermine de jure national sovereignty (Jessop 2002: 43). The region is in that per-
spective used as a coordination-link for state-centric action. The state is also said to react to intensified 
global economic interdependence by constructing new forms of national socioeconomic policy, but 
does not transform itself qualitatively through these growing global interactions (Brenner 1999: 438). 
The emphasis on the vertical cooperation strongly affects the question of resource distribution. The 
aspect of functionality is influenced in this approach by the strong central state and therefore less im-
portant. The horizontal regional integration gets hampered under these circumstances. 
Other more external aspects affect the constellation of both approaches in different ways. Euro-
pean community initiatives such as Interreg are relevant in both models. What is crucial in that sense 
is the composition of the steering committee of such a regional program: A rather national composed 
committee is said to put more emphasise on the use of external financial resources as substitution to 
national redistribution than on the building of strong inter-regional ties. In areas with high relevance in 
security politics this aspect often is a driving force for cooperation and as a topic of high politics more 
on the national than on regional agendas (Jessop 2002: 31). In such a constellation, the sub-regions are 
less independent in cross-border questions but the networks on regional level are fostered to build 
confidence and trust, so-called soft security. The CBC stays therefore rather informal, so that the na-
tional governments can keep their flexibility to deal with their regions as they please. 
Although both approaches are based on the inevitable fact of growing regionalisation, the former 
follows the idea of a region that is built upon regionalist ideas while the latter focuses on a more state-
centric construction. 
The impact of the periphery 
The concept of periphery always needs to be recognised in a geographical context and in relations to a 
particular centre. Implicit disadvantages in the area of economy, the social structure and politics get 
intensified with spatial distance. Urwin and Rokkan (1983: 13) define peripheral regions as “geo-
graphical distant, culturally and economically dependent”. In the paper at hand the following three 
perspectives were used, as by Heintell (1999), to clarify the peripheral grade of the different sub-
regions in each state: 
• Spatial perspective: spatial aspect in the sense of geographical distance 
• Procedural perspective: activities are concentrated in the centre whereas there is a low concentra-
tion of activities in the periphery. 
• Economic perspective: compared to the centre there is low economic activity in the periphery 
(usually measured with the GDP per capita, unemployment rate and the population development). 
Case Study and the Barents-European-Arctic-Region 
The Barents-European-Arctic-Region (BEAR/Barents Region) is a predestined case to test these ap-
proaches as a construct on the extreme periphery in Europe.3 Three quarters of the population in the 
whole area is settled in urban centres while the overall region is counting 0.3 persons per m2. There is 
an obvious decline of population in the region and compared to the centres, the population is less edu-
cated and older in age. The GDP per capita is in all regions distinctively deeper than in the centres. 
                                                 
3 The Barents Region consists of the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and the north-western edge of Russia. 
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Additionally to the geographical remoteness, the transport connections are often very sparse. The re-
gions increasingly depend on national support in certain ways. The question of the ethnic minorities is 
an additional challenge since indigenous groups (Sami, Nenets, Vepsians and Kvens) are spread over 
the whole territory and strive for more independence. 
The remote position of the sub-regions is, although clearly visible in the Nordic countries, 
through the embedding in a redistributing welfare state slightly abated. Peripheral actors, as Keating 
states (2008: 66), do not in general favour regional autonomy, since this may prejudice their privileged 
access to the centre. The inclusion of Russian sub-regions makes the Barents Region even more inter-
esting to ascertain because Europe has to find a way to deal with its direct neighbour in an efficient 
and constructive way. 
The work that has been conducted in this field of research suffers from a lack of comparative 
analysis (Keating 2008: 72). This case-study does not counter this critique but with the theory testing 
procedural method we aim to match the findings with the rivalling theories.4 Therefore analytic gener-
alization is aspired. Through the observation of the process, with the intentions at the beginning of the 
explicit integration on one hand and the situation twelve years later on the other, the promoter’s inten-
sions were not taken as evidence of what has actually happened.5 
Rescaling on the Periphery – the Model of Analysis 
Central in the debate about re-scaling are the forces that advance the process and the functioning of the 
new scale. Perkmann (2007: 257 f.) proposes in the light of the scale debate as well as the regionaliza-
tion literature the three following dimensions of analysis: 
• Political mobilization describes the formation of a social basis, which underpins the creation or 
transformation of the regional scale. Thereby the drivers of the institutionalization and promotion 
of the region, which are characterized by coalitions, are crucial. The coalition-building process 
could roughly be divided in two directions: top-down and bottom-up. The primary interests are 
the basis of the driving forces. 
• Governance building refers to the emerging constellation of political interests. Governance in this 
context is used in a broad sense including exchange, hierarchy and heterarchy. “Empirically it is 
most likely that new scales will rely more narrowly on complex configurations of heterarchic ar-
rangements such as networks.” (Perkmann 2007: 258) Therefore Governance depends on a more 
or less voluntary cooperation and a mutually recognised set of rules. 
• Strategic unification describes the construction of the new scale as an entity for politico-territorial 
intervention. Ideally those are building a link of the strategic interventions and are aiming to-
wards a common social and economical process, often displayed in an overreaching and explicit 
formulated program. The impact of this engagement should focus on the region with shared vi-
sions.  
This model of analysis supposes that political mobilisation is followed by governance building, which 
triggers and influences strategic unification. The causality of this model is tested by means of this 
paper and with the case of the Barents Region. 
To find the adequate theoretical approach through the deductive procedure for the present case, 
the method of “pattern matching” was used. Both approaches were constructed as exclusively as pos-
sible. Following the main question, the process of institutionbuliding of the Barents Region was exam-
                                                 
4 A model for each approach was created in the theoretical presumptions. Causal relations were filtered from the theory and 
dedicated to one of the rivalling approaches. These models and the affiliated hypotheses can be consulted in Strebel (2007). 
5 Data has been conducted in 2006 within a range of expert-interviews in the administrations in all the four countries and on 
national as well as regional level. The relevant basis for the interviews was collected from different sources such as articles, 
books and documents. 
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ined. Therefore the region is divided into units (sub-regions) but the impact for the region as such has 
always been kept in mind. A country is composed of different administrative units, which might also 
show a certain variance among one another. These differences where not examined systematically 
given that the question focuses on the case of the entire region.  
Unique cross-border cooperation in the Barents Region 
Political mobilization 
The character of the process of this cross-border cooperation, seen in a European context, is to a large 
extent very unique. Bob Jessop describes the emergence of cross-border regions on former Cold War-
borders as „resurgence of suppressed historical economic spaces“. In a historical perspective various 
effects shaped today’s scale in the very north of Europe. Even though politicians in the region espe-
cially focus on the Pomor past (trade relation between the Archangelsk region and the north of Nor-
way in the 17th century), it seems much more complex than a logical resurgence. 
The Sami people were organized in the so-called Sami Council from 1956 on. The Russian popu-
lation of this minority was officially incorporated in this representative body in 1991. Therefore the 
urge for an intense cooperation between these minority groups cannot be seen as a strong driver in the 
whole process. Besides the Sami movement, which got more recognition in the last centuries, there 
was never a strong community-sense over the border in the Barents Region that could have triggered a 
counter-mobilization by capitals. Because of the vast distances there has never been a strong common 
cross-border economic zone. Economic exchange was primarily limited to the three Nordic states. The 
sparse trade interaction between the Nordic states and Russia was mainly constrained on symbolic 
acts. These aspects clearly show the impact of the periphery on the construction of regional ideas. 
Hence, para-diplomatic relations between these regions, as suggested by Duchacek, were rather weak. 
This is also the case due to the relatively weak competences of the relevant sub-regions in their coun-
tries. 
The regional sensitiveness in security questions retarded the regional integration. Although the 
cold war was detached from the local level, there was no space for alternative and pluralistic and 
therefore regional ideas. Besides some earlier forms of weak bottom-up cooperation the mobilization 
did clearly develop top-down. The already existing international setup (Nordic Council, Nordkalotten 
Committee) gave the needed backing. Even before the downfall of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorba-
chev laid a cornerstone in 1987 and demanded in the course of the perestroika more cooperation in 
question of resources and the building of a nuclear-free zone. The mobilisation for a more intense 
cooperation around the Barents Sea was clearly driven by the political elite, especially by the Norwe-
gian foreign ministry with a rather strong reservation of Finland and Sweden. The creation of a council 
of ministers and a council of the regions followed the top-down mobilization in 1993 with the Kirke-
nes Declaration signed by all four states. 
It was not possible to clearly evaluate the primary interest in the different countries and their re-
gion concerning this cooperation before 1993. Too many intervening variables were found. The Nor-
wegian regions were strongly engaged in the process, while in the other countries the engagement of 
the regional level was rather weak to non-existing. While for Sweden and Finland this institutionaliza-
tion of the cooperation was no priority, the Russian side was very positive from the beginning al-
though the financial situation did not promise the possibility for strong support. The direct support of 
the European Union during this period could be assessed as throughout positive but rather weak. 
The strengthening of the regional level at the expense of regional redistribution in the Nordic 
countries was not a present issue. Due to this redistribution from the centre to the periphery and the 
resultant dependency, there was only little interest and little space to formalize the regional against the 
national interest. Therefore they took an allied position towards the plans of the foreign ministries. 
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There is a variation between the interests of the different sub-regions and states but altogether the na-
tional level has to be recognized clearly as the driver. Nevertheless the binding of the regions as pro-
posed in the mosaic approach was neither a primary objective nor was the institutionalizing a reaction 
against upcoming regionalism as proposed in the rivalling approach. 
 
Governance building 
“The structures created around the Barents Region are characterized by a duality between central 
and regional authorities. The overall arrangement is clearly multi-layered and rather complex.” 
(Joenniemi 1999: 25) The above mentioned institutional structure with the Barents Council on the 
nation-state level and with the Regional Council on the level of the sub-regions underlines this unique-
ness. 
The different working groups play a central role in the institutional setting of the cooperation. The 
groups are assigned and mandated from either of the two councils and are concentrated mainly on 
regional affairs. The assignment to two levels is losing weight since they are increasingly working 
together on the same topics. It is not clear if the regional level gains from this but the experience 
shows that the competences are still balanced to a greater or lesser extent. The financing of the council 
meetings is in the authority of the current chair. The cost division for programs has to be clarified be-
fore they start and usually it is the central authority that decides on regional support. This often causes 
difficulties since the sub-regions often have to struggle for an adequate budget. Norway is the strong-
est facilitator in this area, while the Russian side usually has trouble to bring its small share together. 
Interreg as the main European community program in the field of cross-border cooperation plays an 
important role both for Sweden and Finland as well as for the Regional Council. It is the only source 
the regional level can manage individually since the Steering Committee of Interreg Kolarctic is 
clearly dominated by them. The overall input from Brussels besides that has to be considered minimal. 
According to the Kirkenes Declaration, the regional level should play a major operative role in 
the implementation of projects in the regions. Although the competences between the levels are offi-
cially clearly divided (political decisions are agreed on the national level, while practical work is real-
ized by the regions) the overall agenda of the Council of Ministers dominates the agenda setting of the 
Regional Council. Within the Regional Council there is only little space for conflicts since decisions 
with binding character cannot be met. The relation between the two councils and the independence of 
the Regional Council is evaluated differently in the four member-states and its regions. In general the 
results support the hypothesis that the more competences are given to the regions within a country, the 
more freely they act in the regional cooperation and the more space they have to create the agenda 
towards the Regional Council. As proposed by Europe of Mosaics the regional level is responsible for 
the maintenance of a strong interregional network, while the political relevant decisions are met on the 
ministerial level. The novelty of an establishment of a regional council in this context must not de-
ceive that the cooperation mainly remains in the hands of the national actors. 
In comparative political science the Nordic states are often described as similar concerning the 
type of liberal democracy and strong welfare state (Arter 1999: 4). Despite these institutional premises 
they also exhibit important lines of inter-regional differences, especially concerning the balance of 
power between the state and the regional bodies. Compared to Norway, the Swedish and Finish re-
gional administration is less experienced with extended competences. Consisting of Oblasts, Okrugs, 
Krays and independent republics on the same level, Russia is a patchwork of regional structures with 
an extensive variance in competence and regional autonomy. In general, there was no shift of legal 
competences in any country that could be traced back to the Barents cooperation. Although this shift 
was a stated target in the declaration of 1993 and not reached within twelve years, the regions were 
able to gain more influence on the agenda setting in the foreign ministries. From a federal point of 
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view, the Russian system is still too volatile and hierarchic for regions to influence the national level 
substantially. 
To summarize it can be said that although factors like Interreg strengthened the regional network 
and the Regional Council as an operative entity while the Council of Ministers is the central and deci-
sive actor in the institutional setting. The regions of all four countries are in an ongoing conflict with 
the central government about finances but basically the relation between the central government and 
the relevant regions can be described as cooperative. This arrangement corresponds to the model of 
Europe of Mosaics. 
 
Strategic unification 
Through the dominance of the Europe of Mosaic approach in the two foregoing parts, it can be ex-
pected that the national administration aims for a loose regional concept with national purposes on the 
agenda and weak institutions. These expectations were proved with the wish for an international secre-
tariat in Kirkenes. The Norwegian aim for a stronger integration through corporate funding of such an 
institution took 14 years to be established. Sweden and Finland where sceptical about the financing, 
that would strengthen the Norwegian position with its financial power. This administrative body is the 
first in the Barents Region that is financed by all the participants and mandated on a permanent basis. 
The objectives of the Barents 2010 program (financed by Interreg IIIB “Baltic Sea”) is to generate 
economic growth and social development by a knowledge-driven and sustainable exploitation of the 
region’s natural resources and to make the region as a whole more competitive. This approach is also 
non-binding like the Kirkenes Declaration. Following Young (2004: 140), there is no comprehensive 
strategy apparent in this program. Since the financing is arranged externally, the program did not im-
plicate any further formalization. Besides trying to functionally integrate the region horizontally, 
mechanisms are emerging in the states for a better integration of the regions in a functional term in the 
national arrangement.  
Both councils get support from all the relevant bodies on both levels. Further on the councils 
should create a good basis for the advancement of soft-security in the minds of all the institutional 
actors. 
The general tendency can be labled as ambivalent. In general, the national actors are critical vis-
à-vis a strong formal integration, exceptions exist as with the Barents Secretariat. The plans of the 
ministerial level are generally less transparent than those of the sub-regions. Therefore the tendency of 
the future seems that on the ministerial level of the cooperation an additional formalization is barely 
going to take place. Technical questions are rarely addressed and the cooperation on this level seems 
mainly ceremonial. It seems the case that the Nordic states are eager to strengthen the relations with 
Russia especially regarding the resource question.  
The Policy of the CBC basically obeys the premises of Europe of Mosaics. Nevertheless, regional 
concerns are accommodated and therefore useful to create legitimacy. In this part the model has to be 
adjusted in the sense that the concept for the region focuses explicitly regional questions while implic-
itly national and international issues are at stake. Over time, a stronger integration can not be pre-
cluded.  
Conclusion - An adjusted Mosaic on the periphery 
This paper uses a framework for analysing processes of re-scaling that was first used by Perkmann 
(2005) and the case of the cross-border region EUREGIO. This framework was useful to create a 
model of analysis for both rivalling theories. 
The Barents Region proves to be on the extreme periphery in all perspectives. The low popula-
tion-density, the distances to the national centres and the economic structure fortify the periphery and 
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give the region their unique character. The political mobilization was not a reaction in order to prevent 
a regional movement that seemed to grow together too much. It was more the aspect of soft security as 
a tool of high-politics, which made the state-level to be the launcher in a new international environ-
ment after the changes in Russia. The formation of a regional Council from the start on shows that it is 
not only a state-driven cooperation, even though the state-level has the last word on crucial decisions. 
The influence of the sub-regions differs between the countries since policymaking towards the 
regions takes place in the states itself rather than in the two councils. Therefore the settings follow the 
state-centric approach since important decisions and the main directions, especially in Sweden, 
Finland and Russia, are given by the capitals while the regions mainly play an executive role. It has to 
be mentioned that the regional influence in the states concerning foreign politics towards the BEAR 
improved since the Kirkenes Declaration was launched. 
Compared to the state-centric approach the driver does not retard the institutional ties. In contrast: 
especially Norway tries to tie these bindings even closer and to thicken the institutional network. This 
is underlined in the newly established international secretariat, which was mainly stipulated by Nor-
way as well as Russia and is the first permanent body, paid by all the members. The idea of a func-
tional region on a more equal basis (concerning living conditions and political stability) seems to be 
the main task for positive cooperation in the future. This idea also stands behind the Barents 2010 
project that keeps the institutional bindings as loose as possible. A clear shared vision of the national 
as well as regional actors could not be recognised. 
Europe of Mosaic is the dominant approach in the Barents context but the periphery is an indica-
tor that is reconfigurating the approach in certain dimensions. The area is geographically too extensive 
for a strong regionalism to have developed in the past. An interceding variable for this was further-
more the mechanism of social redistribution especially in the egalitarian Nordic states. Concluding 
that the development only enforces the relations of the regions with their own capital would be incor-
rect. There are some signs that certain competences, even if they are informal, seem to have shifted 
with the re-scaling process to the regional administrations to some extent in the past years.  
Even though the region is far away from the proclaimed European idea of a functional cross-
border region, a certain shift in the scales took place in the Barents Region. The integration of Russian 
regions implicates some uncertainties and difficulties, but with this unique character the Barents Re-
gion can also be a further model of integration at a former Cold War border.  
Multiple-case studies with additional peripheral regions would be required to strengthen or mod-
ify the adjusted model of Europe of mosaics. Some discovered causal factors might carry some re-
sponsibility in the re-scaling process in the region. Since they need to be analyzed in a wider histori-
cal, national and global context a comparison would be very delicate. As already remarked by Perk-
mann (2007: 264) a related open question is whether the features of re-scaling processes ‘cluster’ into 
specific configurations in the sense that particular modes of political mobilization tend to go hand in 




This paper is based on research that has been conducted in the setting of a thesis that has been handed 
in in autumn 2006 at the University of Zürich. Many thanks to Daniel Kübler, Urs Scheuss and Bjørn 
Sagdahl for the discussion and their input during this project. 
 
 
Regionbuilding at a European periphery: A case study of re-scaling in the Barents Region 
 9
References 
ARTER D. (1999): Scandinavian Politics Today. Manchester University Press, Manchester.  
BLATTER J. (2004): ‘From spaces of place’ to ‘spaces of flows’? Territorial and functional govern-
ance in cross-border regions in Europe and North America, International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 28, 530. 
BRENNER N. (2001): The limits to scale? Methodological reflections on scalar structuration, Pro-
gress in Human Geography 25, 591-614. 
BRENNER N. (1999): Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Re-scaling of Urban Governance in 
the European Union, Urban Studies 69, 431-451. 
DUCHACEK I. (1990): Perforated Sovereignities: Towards A Typology of New Actors in Interna-
tional Relations, in MICHELMANN-SOLDATOS (ed.): Federalism and International Relations, 
pp. 1-34. Clarendon, Oxford.  
FITJAR R. (2006): Building Regions on Economic Success: Prosperity and Regionalism in Rogaland, 
Scandinavian Political Studies 29,333-355. 
GRASSE A. (2001): The Myth of Regionalisation in Europe, Journal of European Area Studies 9: 79-
92. 
HEINTEL M. (1999): Zentrum, Peripherie und Grenze: Alte und neue Herausforderungen in der euro-
päischen Raumplanungspolitik, SWS-Rundschau 39: 257-265. 
HOOGHE L. and MARKS G. (2003): Unravelling the Central State, But How? Types of Multi-level 
Governance, American Political Science Review 97: 233-243.  
JOENNIEMI P. (1999): The Barents Euro-Arctic Council, in: COTTEY A. (ed.): Subregional Coop-
eration in the New Europe, Building Security, Prosperity and Solidarity from the Barents to the 
Black Sea, pp. 23-45. Palgrave: Basingstoke. 
JESSOP B. (2002) The political economy of scale, in PERKMANN M. AND SUM N. (Eds) Global-
ization, Regionalization and Crossborder Regions, pp. 25–49. Palgrave, Houndsmills, NY. 
KEATING M. (2008): Thirty Years of Territorial Politics, West European Politics 31: 60-81. 
KEATING M. (1998): The New Regionalism in Western Europe. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
NILSON H. (1997): Nordic Regionalization: On How Transborder Regions Work and Why They 
Don’t Work, Cooperation and Conflict 32: 399-426. 
PERKMANN M. (2007): The construction of New Territorial Scales: A Framework and Case Study 
of the EUREGIO Cross-border Region, Regional Studies 41: 253-266. 
ROKKAN S. and URWIN D. (1983): Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of West European Pe-
ripheries. Sage, London. 
SCHMITT-EGNER P. (2005): Handbuch zur Europäischen Regionalismusforschung. Verlag für So-
zialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. 
SCOTT J. (2000): Euroregions, Governance, and transborder cooperation within the EU, In: VAN 
DER VELDE M. and VAN HOUTUM H (eds.): Borders, Regions, and People, pp. 104–115. Pion: 
London. 
STREBEL F. (2007): Europe of Regions vs. Europe of Mosaics: re-scaling in einem peripheren 
Grenzraum. Die Barents Euro-Arctic Region – eine Fallstudie, NCCR Working Paper 11. Online: 
http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/nccr/publications [online: 5/2008]. 
STRIHAN A. (2007): A network-based Approach to Regional Borders: The Case of Belgium, Re-
gional Studies 42: 1-16. 
SWYNGEDOUW E. (2004): Globalisation or ‘glocalisation’? Networks, territories and rescaling, 
Cambridge Review of International Affiars 17: 25-48. 
YOUNG O. (2004): International Cooperation in the Circumpolar North, A module of the University 
of the Arctic. http:// www.uarctic.org/bcs/BCS100 [online: 10/2006]. 
